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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
REJECTION OF TIME-8HARE
PURCHASER AGREEMENTS IN
BANKRUPTCY-LET THE BUYER
BEWARE!

Recent legislative proposals designed to amynd the Bankruptcy
Code for the purpose of protecting
purchasers of vacation time-share
interests highlight the current risk
that many time-share consumers
assume, perhaps unknowingly. 1
These bills are reactions to the unfavorable treatment given to
time-share interest holders in the
bankruptcy case of In re Sombrero Reef Club, .Inc. 2 where the
bankruptcy court in Florida allowed the rejectipn of time-share
purchase agreements as executory
contracts.
In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc.

The debtor in Sombrero Reef
owned a resort-marina complex in
the Flqrida Keys. Prior to filing a
* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
·
** Professor of Law, Hofstra University
School of Law, Hempstead, New York;
associated with the law firm of Moritt,
Wolfeld & Resnick, Garden City, New
York; associate member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
1
SeeS. 1013 (Subtitle G) and H.R. 217,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
2 18 Bankr. 612 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
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chapter 11 petition, it entered into
approximately 200 time-share purchase.agreements in an unsuccessful attempt to tum the property
into a time-share operation. The
debtor moved to reject the timeshare purchase agreements as
executory contracts under Section
365 of the Bankruptcy Code in
conjunction with a motion for
leave to sell the real property. The
debtor also filed a complaint for a
declaratory judgment against the
time-share purchasers declaring
that they would have no further
rights in the underlying property
upon such rejection. In particular,
the debtor sought an order declaring that the time-share agreements
were not protected by the special
provisions contained in Section
365(h) protecting nondebtor lessees of reai estate, 3 or by Section
3

Section 365(h) provides:
(I) If the trustee rejects an unexpired
lease of real property of the debtor
under which. the debtor is the lessor, the
lessee under such lease may treat the
lease as terminated by such rejection,
or, in the alternative, may remain in
possession for the balance of the term of
_such lease and any renewal or extension
of such term that is enforceable by such
lessee under applicable nonbankruptcy
law.
(2) If such lessee remains in possession,
such lessee may off~et agail)st the rent
reserved under such lease for the balance of the term after the date of the
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365(i)4 protecting purchasers of
Under the prototype agreement
real estate who are in possession of used by the Sombrero Reef dethe property prior to the bank- veloper, labeled "Latitude 24 degree Vacation Club Membership
ruptcy of the-seller.
Agreement," consumers paid an
rejection of such lease, and any such initial price which, depending on
renewal or extension, any damages occurring after such date caused by the the type of accommodation and
'nonperformance of any obligation of the the season chosen, ranged from
debtor after such date, but such lessee under $1,000 to over $3,0oo: An·
does not have any rights against the estate on account of any damages arising nual dues charged ranged from
after such date fr!)m such rejection, $42 to $84. In exchange, purother than such offset.
.chasers were granted the right to
4 Section 365(i) provides:
use the type of accommodation
initially selected for one week per
(1) If the trustee rejects an executory
contract of the debtor for the sale of real year over a thirty-year period.
property under which the purchaser is in
possession, such purchaser may treat Reservations had to be made not
such contract as terminated, or, in the less than sixty days and not more
alternative, may remain in possession of than one year in advance of the
such real property.
desired week from a list of avail(2) If such purchaser remains in posses- able accommodations. Purchasers
sio~
(A) such purchaser shall continue could not specify particular units
to make all payments due under such for their use. Sombrero Reef
contract, but may, offset against such
guaranteed the maintenance of
payments any damages occurring
after the date of the rejection of such facilities and services. The agreecontract caused by the nonperfor- ment provided for the payment of
mance of any obligation of the debtor the purchase price, either in full or
after such date, but such purchaser
does not have any rights against the in installments, and the payment
estate on account of any damages aris- of the annual dues, whether or not
ing after such date from such rejec- the accommodations were, in
tion, other than such offset; and
fact, used by the purchaser.
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to
such purchaser in accordance with the
provisions of such contract, but is relieved of all other obligations to perform under such contract.

The Court's Reasoning
The court held that the timeshare agreements are executory
contracts even if the entire purchase price had been paid. The
court found that these agreements
left substantial obligations to be
performed on both sides and,
therefore, they are executory contracts.5 The debtor was obligated

See also § 365(j), which provides:
A purchaser that treats an executory
contract as terminated under subsection
(i) of this section, or a party whose
executory contract to purchase real
property from the debtor is rejected and
under which such party is not in possession, has a lien on the interest of the
·debtor in such property for the recovery
of any portion of the purcha'se price that
such purchaser or party has paid.

s The court applied the definition of
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under these agreements to provide
services and maintain the premises
in the future, while the purchasers
agreed to pay annual dues ($42 to
$84) which the court characterized as·' 'not a de minimis obligation." The court approved rejection of these contracts, concluding that rejection would benefit the estate.
The court focused on the nature
of the time-share interests to determine whether the special protections for lessees (§ 365(h)(l))
or for purchases of real estate
under land sale contracts (§ 365
(i)(l)) were applicable and concluded that this form of timeshare agreement did not constitute
a lease, despite the existence of
nondisturbance agreements with
mortgagees, and did not constitute
.a sale of real property ("no delivery of title of any kind was contemplated").6 Thus, the rejection
of these contracts gave the purchasers only unsecured claims
against the estate and enabled the
debtor to sell the premises free of
the time-share consumers' right to
use the premises.
It is interesting that the timeshare agreements were rejected
despite a state statute designed to
protect time-share consumers in
the event of a sale of the premises.
Florida enacted the Real Estate
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Time Share Act? which prohibits a
sale of the real estate unless it is
made subject to the rights of the
time-share purchasers. The timeshare agreements expressly provide that no sale will occur unless
the buyer of the premises agrees
to assume the obligations of the
seller with respect to the timeshare agreements. Nonetheless,
the court concluded:
If the Florida statute is an attempt
to prohibit such a breach by a
time-share developer it is preempted by Federal bankruptcy law.
... The Florida legislature presumably had the intent of protecting
time-share owners, an intent which
this court is in sympathy with, but
to the extent that Chapter 721, Fla.
Stats. frustrates the operatior. of
bankruptcy law, the statute is invalid. Therefore, it is not a bar to
rejection of the contracts. 8

Lessons to Be Learned

Sombrero Reef is a warning to
purchasers of time-share interests.
If the owner of the vacation resort
winds up in a bankruptcy case, rejection of time-share agreements
may mean the termination of the
purchasers' interests in the resort.
However, there are several observations that should be made.
First, Sombrero Reef involved
tim.e-share agreements that were
not leases and gave purchasers no
interest
in the land. A different reexecutory contract set forth by Professor
Countryman. See Countryman, "Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy," 57 Minn.
L. Rev. 439, 460 (1973).
6 18 Bankr. at 618.
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Fla. Stats. ch. 721.
18 Bankr. at 620.
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suit might have occurred if timeshare purchasers had received an
_interest in land by deed (such as
tenancies in common) or if purchasers had received recordable
leasehold interests, either by giving a legal representative a lease
on b~half of all time-share consumers or by granting individual
leases.
Second, although the reader
may respond to Sombrero Reef
with nothing but sympathy for the
consumer who prepaid for timeshare vacation privileges, the
court treated such 'consumers the
way most consumers are treated
under the Code. Section 507(a)(5)
of the Code gives consumers who
prepaid for goods or services an
unsecured claim with a fifth level
priority up to $900. Why should
the time-share purchaser have
superior rights when compared
with the consumer who has a
long-term prepaid contract for orthodontic services? Perhaps a
broader congressional look at the
rights of consumer creditors would
be appropriate.

Third, the time-share purchasers' position in' Sombrero
Reef and the proposed legislation
would give time-share purchasers
the same rights as lessees under
Section 365(h) or purchasers of
land in possession under Section
365(i). Yet this may be inconsistent with the original purpose of
these subsections. Congress intended to protect those in possession of real estate from the detriment and hardship associated
with losing possession upon the
landlord' s/seller' s bankruptcy. It
is doubtful that the loss of the
right to possess a room in a resort
for one or two weeks each year
was what Congress had in mind.
It is difficult to predict with
certainty whether the Sombrero
Reef holding will be followed by
other courts or whether it will be
left undisturbed by Congress. In
any event, however, until further
judicial or legislative action,
counsel for consumers contemplating the purchase of timeshare interests should read Sombrero Reef.
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